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Political connection and managerial entrenchment: Evidence
from CEO turnovers in China

Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence that political connection can hurt corporate
governance by aggravating managerial entrenchment. CEO’s political connection
lowers the probability of forced CEO turnover by about 20% on average in Chinese
listed firms. This pattern is especially strong in privately controlled firms compared to
state-owned enterprises. Political connection also significantly lowers the sensitivity
between CEO turnover and firm performance, thereby weakening disciplinary
mechanism to replace poorly performing CEOs. Following forced CEO turnover in
the presence of political connection, firm performance improves. These findings
provide strong evidence that political connection does indeed lead to undesirable
managerial entrenchment.

Key words: Turnover, political connection, incentives, China, managerial
entrenchment
JEL: G30 G32 G34
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1. Introduction
A substantial body of literature on political connection has emerged in recent
years (Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2008;
Chen et al., 2010; Faccio, 2010; Faccio et al., 2010). The extant studies focus
primarily on the sources of value that political connection provides, such as
preferential access to credit, regulatory protection, and government financial
assistance. Whereas these benefits can enhance firm value, research also points to the
downside of such connections: the substantial resources that politically connected
firms must dedicate to rent seeking activities (Faccio, 2010). In the case of China,
although several papers document a positive effect of political connection in privately
controlled firms (Li et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008), Fan et al., (2007) provide clear
evidence of its negative effect on firm performance in state-owned enterprises
(SOEs).
One important disciplinary mechanism for enhancing managerial incentives is
CEO turnover, a credible threat or action to replace underperforming CEOs, whose
relationship to firm performance has been studied extensively (Denis et al., 1997;
Volpin, 2002; Huson et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2008; Conyon and He, 2008; Chang
and Wong, 2009). These prior studies, often treating CEO turnover as an internal
monitoring mechanism, document both a negative relationship between CEO turnover
and firm performance and an improvement in firm performance after CEO
replacement. Our paper thus attempts to fill a research void by examining the impact
of political connection on CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship.
In China, political connection is a common phenomenon because, even though
the corporatization and privatization of state owned economy since 1978 has resulted
somewhat in the decentralization of authority, the state shareholder still controls
3
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personnel decisions. Most particularly, either the central or local government has
authority over the selection, appointment, and dismissal of top executives in SOEs.
Even privately controlled firms, if converted from former SOEs, are likely to build
political connections or maintain previous connections because they provide
preferential access to financial resources like loans and help companies to avoid strict
regulatory oversight (Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008). At the
same time, because China is also a transitional economy with weak law enforcement
and institutional constraints, many Chinese companies are involved with the state,
operate with low efficiency (Wei et al., 2005), and have poor corporate governance
(Firth et al., 2006). Thus, whether CEOs are disciplined appropriately and monitored
effectively remains an open question. The Chinese context therefore provides an
excellent laboratory in which to examine and explain the effects of political
connection on the corporate governance system, particularly on CEO turnover and
turnover-performance sensitivity.
Based on a comprehensive sample of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms from
2002 to 2007, we define politically connected firms as those whose CEOs were
formerly or are currently officers affiliated with the government. 1 We find that nearly
45% of the CEOs in our sample are politically connected, 34.55% in SOEs and
10.45% in privately controlled firms. First, we not only find a significant negative
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance, we show that this
relationship is much stronger in privately controlled firms than in SOEs, which
suggests that such CEO turnover is occurring to replace poorly performing executives.
Second, we find that CEOs are less likely to be replaced if they are politically
connected, an effect that is significantly stronger in privately controlled firms. Third,
1

Our definition of political connection is the same as that used in previous studies, including Faccio et
al. (2006), Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2010).
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we find that, consistent with Denis et al. (1997), managerial ownership is inversely
related to CEO turnover. We also provide strong empirical evidence that CEOs with
political connections are associated with a significantly lower turnover-performance
relationship than their non-politically connected peers. More important, we find that
following CEO turnover, firm performance increases more significantly in firms
without political connections than in those with political connections. However, in
firms with such connections, CEO replacement can effectively enhance firm
performance relative to the performance of firms in which no CEO replacement
occurs.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to document the entrenchment
effect of CEOs’ political connections, which, our results indicate, can substitute for
the disciplinary mechanism of CEO turnover by lowering turnover-performance
sensitivity. In fact, the evidence clearly suggests that politically connected CEOs are
more entrenched and more likely to retain their positions even when the firm is
experiencing poor performance. By being among the first to carry out comprehensive
analysis of the CEO turnover-firm performance association in China, this study makes
a valuable contribution to the extant literature on corporate governance. Most
particularly, we offer the first empirical findings on whether political connection
affects CEO turnover and how it substitutes for internal governance by lowering
turnover-performance sensitivity.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
review of the extant literature. Section 3 develops detailed hypotheses. Section 4
describes the data and outlines the research methods. Section 5 reports the empirical
results. Section 6 presents our examination of post-turnover performance, and section
7 concludes the paper.
5

2. Literature review
International evidence on executive turnover, a major topic within the corporate
governance area, amply documents the replacement of top executives as an alternative
mechanism for disciplining underperforming top executives by showing that CEO
turnover is often associated with poor firm performance and low managerial
ownership (Kaplan, 1994a, 1994b; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Franks et al., 2001;
Conyon and Florou, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Weisbach (1988) finds that poor firm
performance is related to forced CEO turnover. Denis et al. (1997), furthermore,
provide evidence that CEO turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of
officers and directors. We therefore extend Denis et al. (1997) by explicitly examining
whether political connection of CEOs affects CEO turnovers in addition to ownership
of executives.
Several studies examine top executive turnover and its relation to firm
performance in China (Groves et al., 1995; Aivazian et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007;
Cheng et al., 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009). Among these, Kato and Long (2006)
show that CEO turnover is negatively related to a firm’s financial performance, a
finding that Firth et al. (2006) confirm by focusing on the relationship between
chairman turnover and firm performance. Likewise, Conyon and He (2008), who
examine both CEO and chairman turnover using a 1999−2006 sample of 1,200
Chinese listed firms, find that, consistent with the agency model, the turnover of both
types of top official is inversely related to a firm’s profitability.
Studies on the function of political connection provide evidence for two different
aspects: the benefits of political connection and the costs of related rent seeking
activities. Studies focused on the benefits show that political connection can help
6

firms by relaxing tax regulation, enabling preferential corporate bailouts and/or
financing convenience, and facilitating rent seeking (Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et
al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010), all of which suggest a positive effect on firm value and
performance. Other researchers, however, argue that politically connected firms must
devote substantial resources to their rent seeking activities, which may well eliminate
any advantage from the political connection (Fan et al., 2007; Faccio, 2010). These
authors view political connection as government intervention and a desire to satisfy
the objectives of social services. Both viewpoints are observable in the emerging
research on China.

Li et al. (2008), for instance, using a sample of China’s privately

controlled listed firms, provide evidence that politically connected CEOs have a
positive effect on firm performance. Fan et al. (2007), on the other hand, who use a
1993−2001 sample of IPO firms to focus primarily on the intervention of political
connection, argue that politically connected firms underperform those without
political connection. These previous studies, however, do not examine the effect of
political connection on CEO turnover. We therefore hope to shed light on this issue
using a sample of all the nonfinancial firms listed on two Chinese stock exchanges.

3. Institutional background and hypotheses
Over the last 30 years, China has adopted economic reforms and an SOE
restructuring process that have resulted in decision-making rights being decentralized
from the government to the firm level, Nonetheless, although the state has
relinquished authority in some areas, it retains control of many SOEs, particularly in
terms of appointments to top managerial positions in state-controlled firms. Thus,
political intervention has a significant impact on corporate governance systems.
Moreover, as many authors argue, it is not the state itself that is the real owner of
7

SOEs but rather agents of the government who are acting on the government’s behalf.
As a result, state shareholders have multiple objectives beyond simply maximizing
firm value as expected in the traditional agency model. There is therefore a need to
examine how top management is monitored and whether the current internal
monitoring mechanism is effective.
During the early 1990s, some SOEs were allowed to issue shares and trade on the
two stock exchanges set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The motivation behind this
corporatization and privatization process was the government’s desire to adopt a
market-oriented economic system. In this sense, CEOs are now acting more like their
counterparts in western countries and are taking responsibility for maximizing
shareholder wealth. According to agency theory, there is a high probability that these
CEOs will be terminated or replaced in the presence of poor firm performance,
suggesting a negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance that
is indeed supported by many studies on China (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al.,
2006; Chang and Wong, 2009). We therefore construct the following hypothesis:
H1: CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance.
The emerging research on China also extensively examines the role of political
connection (Li et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010), pointing to its
occurrence in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. Chinese SOEs, however,
have one unique characteristic: a politically controlled personnel system in which
different levels of government have the ultimate authority over the appointment and
dismissal of many top executives, which results directly in politically connected
CEOs. In addition, SOE reform has been characterized by the separation of the
government function from enterprise management, leading many government officials
to choose positions in the latter over their original positions in government.
8

On the other hand, since the Chinese market appears underdeveloped and
inefficient and provides little protection for outside investors, the privately controlled
firms have incentives to establish political connections to extract rents from the
government and obtain relief from some of their problems (Faccio, 2010). As a result,
two waves of political connection establishment took place in privately controlled
firms, involving mainly politically connected CEOs. The first wave occurred in the
early 1990s just after Deng Xiaoping’s inspection of south China, when many
government officials chose to become self-employed and establish their own
businesses. The second wave transpired during the early 2000s when some
government officials relinquished their original positions to accept posts in privately
controlled firms. These privately controlled firms, in turn, were likely to appoint
politically connected CEOs, especially when they found themselves in financial
distress (Li et al., 2006). This political connection in privately controlled firms is seen
as a resource and a protection from government that can improve firm performance
and overcome state or market failure (Li et al., 2008). Consequently, private investors
are more likely to retain politically connected CEOs in order to maintain their power
and performance. Accordingly, because of the benefits derived from such political
connection, we conjecture that politically connected CEOs are more likely to be
entrenched and less likely to be dismissed:
H2: CEO turnover is negatively related to CEO political connection.
As discussed above, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be terminated,
suggesting a weaker relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. In
addition, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee of the
State Council (SASAC), the agent of the government, has issued interim regulations
on evaluating the operating performance of top executives in central government
9

affiliated SOEs, which include a “talking system” that precludes the punishment or
immediate dismissal of poorly performing executives in SASAC-controlled SOEs. In
such cases, the SASAC sends experts to help these SOEs overcome performance
failure (SASAC, 2003), a mediation also used in SOEs controlled by the local
SASAC. Moreover, because these politically connected CEOs are more likely to act
as government representatives, they care more about the growth of the state-owned
assets invested in SOEs and such objectives as the labor force supply and the region’s
budgetary deficit (Chang and Wong, 2009). Nonetheless, politically connected CEOs
in privately controlled firms also have a close relationship with the government and
always perform better than their peers without political connections. At the same time,
private investors are motivated to retain all the benefits arising from their political
connections and are less likely to dismiss politically connected CEOs even when they
underperform. Therefore, political connection is likely to lead to a weaker
turnover-performance relationship:
H3: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker if the CEO is
politically connected.
Because state-owned firms operate with multiple objectives (e.g., providing social
services), they do not focus solely on maximizing firm value (Clarke, 2003). In this
sense, CEO turnover in state-owned firms may also be determined by certain other
indicators. Nonetheless, because private investors appoint CEOs as their
representatives with the aim of maximizing shareholder wealth, private controlling
shareholders have sufficient incentives to monitor top managers and dismiss them for
poor performance (Firth et al., 2006). We thus hypothesize the following:
H4: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker in SOEs and
stronger in privately controlled firms.
10

Our last hypothesis relates to managerial ownership by politically connected
CEOs, who in many cases are awarded firm equity to better align managerial behavior
with the interests of shareholders and promote increased firm value (Hu and Zhou,
2008; Benson and Davidson, 2009). In such cases, if the convenience resulting from
political connection is to be fully utilized, politically connected CEOs are more likely
to be entrenched and less likely to be removed because of their close relationship with
the firm:
H5: The CEO turnover-firm performance relationship is weaker if the politically
connected CEOs hold managerial ownership.

4. Sample selection and research methods
4.1 Sample selection
We obtain information on CEO-specific characteristics from the Chinese Stock
and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and on firm-specific
characteristics from the SinoFin database. Our original sample consists of all firms
listed on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2007. We
begin our sample in 2002 because listed firms have been exercising new accounting
and audit standards since 2001. Consistent with prior studies, we delete ST and *ST 2
firms from our population. To address the specially regulated industry consideration,
we also exclude financial industry firms with unique accounting standards. Finally, we
exclude observations for which information is missing. Our final sample consists of
1,096 listed firms and 6,297 firm-year observations. Table 1 lists the detailed
information on CEO turnover and departing CEOs. The total number of turnovers is
2

ST stands for special treatment. The stock exchanges flag a listed firm ST when irregularities appear in
its financial or accounting statement. These firms also have negative net profits for two consecutive
years. *ST refers to listed firms that have negative net profits for three consecutive years and have a
high probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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1,422.
We manually collect the data on CEOs’ political connection by searching the listed
firm’s annual reports from 2002 to 2007. For every firm in each year, we compile a
CEO profile that includes age, gender, education, experience, and professional
background. Based on this profile, we trace CEOs’ political connections by examining
whether they are current or former officers of either the central government, the local
government, or the military; are members of the standing committee of the National
People’s Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), or the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC); or are the
secretary or a member of a party committee in SOEs.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Distinguishing between forced and voluntary turnovers based on public
information is difficult because the press is unlikely to explicitly mention whether the
CEO turnover was forced or not. Therefore, to examine the effectiveness of
monitoring CEO turnover as a punishment related to poor firm performance, we adopt
the following procedure to define CEO turnover. First, we obtain the reasons for the
CEO turnover from the CSMAR database and, for ease of exposition, partition them
into two groups: normal and forced. The normal turnover group includes 745 cases in
which the stated reasons are retirement, contract expiration, resignation, completion of
active duties, health, personal reasons, change in controlling shareholder, legal
disputes, and corporate governance reform. For the remaining turnovers, we trace the
destinations of the departing CEOs to identify whether the turnover was normal or
forced. Of the remaining 677 cases, 225 cases appear to be normal turnovers,
including 10 cases in which the CEO took up a position in the government, 92 cases
in which the CEO was promoted to chairman or vice chairman of the board, 51 cases
12

in which the CEO accepted a managerial position in the parent company, 70 cases in
which the CEO remained as chairman or vice-chairman, and 2 cases in which the
CEO was going abroad for further education.
We treat the remaining 452 cases as forced turnovers. These include 94 cases in
which the CEO took up a less prestigious position within the firm, 22 cases in which
the CEO left and took up a position in an unlisted or smaller firm, 42 cases in which
the CEO was dismissed, and 294 cases in which the departing CEO’s destination is
untraceable but CEOs are replaced in unusual circumstances within his tenure. We
classify these latter as forced turnover because, given the numerous reasons for CEO
departure, information on the turnover is unlikely to be unavailable if the turnover
was voluntary. In addition, Firth et al. (2006) argue that resignation may be a face
saving device for CEOs who would otherwise be punished or dismissed. We therefore
conduct robustness tests by reclassifying resignation as a forced turnover.
Of our original forced turnover sample, we exclude 31 cases in which the CEO
tenure is less than one year, because such a short period is unlikely to reflect poor
performance. We also add 20 cases for which the stated reason is retirement but the
age of the departing CEO is lower than 60. Finally, we identify 981 cases as normal
turnovers and 441 cases as forced turnovers, representing 68.99% and 31.01% of the
total turnovers, respectively.
4.2 Methodology
We apply the following regression to examine the effects of political connection
on CEO turnovers and the turnover-performance relationship:
Turnoverit = α0 + α1Perfit −1 + α2 Perfit −1 * Privateit + α3 Politicalit + α4 Politicalit * Privateit
+ α5 Politicalit * Perfit −1 + α6 Mownit + α7 Mownit * Perfit −1 * Privateit + α8 Sizeit
+ α9 Ageit + α10Tenureit + α11Boardit + α12 Pondit + α13 Levit + α14 Dualityit
+ Industy + Year + ε it
13

(1)

where Turnover is measured by forced turnover (as delineated above), which can
reflect the effectiveness of the CEO monitoring mechanism. Perf is firm performance,
measured as the return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS); Political is a
dummy variable, coded 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; Size is
firm size, defined as the log of firm total assets; and Age is the log of CEO age.
Tenure is the log of years that the CEO has held the CEO position; Board is the log of
the total number of directors on the board; Pond is the proportion of independent
directors on the board; Lev is the firm leverage level; and Duality is a dummy variable
coded 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. We also control
for industry and year fixed effects.
Following Huson et al. (2001) and Chang and Wong (2009), we use the current
year’s performance if the CEO turnover occurred in the second half of the year and
the previous year’s performance if the CEO turnover occurred in the first half of the
year. By doing so, we can partially address the endogeneity issue.

4.3 Summary statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. As Panel
A shows, the total turnover rate is 23%. Our regression also employs a set of control
variables that show the average tenure of the CEOs to be 3.26 years, which is longer
than that reported by Chang and Wong (2009). The mean value of CEO duality
indicates that 12% of the total observations are CEOs who also serve as firm chairman.
The results in Panel B also show a significant decrease in the annual turnover rate
during the sample period, decreasing from 27.42% in 2002 to 20.63% in 2007. These
results also indicate that normal turnover accounts for the majority (around 70%) of
total turnovers. As outlined above, the reasons for forced turnovers are related to poor
14

performance and thus reflect the disciplinary power of the internal monitoring
mechanism, whereas the reasons for normal turnovers include retirement, health
problems, promotion, moving laterally, and accepting other prestigious positions.
Since our paper examines the effect of political connection on CEO turnover and the
turnover-performance relationship, the rest of the paper focuses only on forced CEO
turnover.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

5. Empirical results
5.1 Univariate tests
Table 3 shows the turnover rates by quartile of firm performance for the full
sample: it also tests for equality between the lowest and highest quartiles. To do so,
we divide the firms into four quartiles based on the industry-adjusted ROA (Panel A)
and four quartiles based on the industry-adjusted ROS (Panel B). We find that CEO
turnover rate increases with decreasing firm performance. First, the results in Panel A
show that CEO turnover is significantly higher for firms with poor ROA than for
firms with good ROA. Second, Panel B clearly reveals an association between poor
ROS and forced CEO turnover. For example, firms with the poorest ROA (bottom
quartile) replaced their CEOs in 9.39% of cases, whereas firms with the highest ROA
only replaced their CEOs in 4.57% of cases, a 4.82% difference (9.39%-4.57%)
(t-value = 5.35(2.35). These results generally support our hypothesis that forced CEO
turnover is positively related to poor firm performance.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Table 4 reports the results of our univariate tests of CEO turnover. Here, we divide
15

the total sample into two groups of firms with and without political connection. Then,
to assess whether the CEO turnover rate shows significant differences, we sort the
firms based on firm performance and managerial ownership. For example, in Panel A
of Table 4, we divide our total sample into two subsamples (politically connected vs.
non-politically firms) and sort them by industry-adjusted ROA. For firms with a
higher firm performance, the mean (median) of the CEO turnover rate is 4.80% (0%)
in politically connected firms, which is significantly lower than the 6.32% (0%) in
non-politically connected firms (t-value = -1.92 (-3.62)). To test robustness, we then
repeat our comparative analysis with firms sorted by industry-adjusted ROS and
obtain similar results. 3 Overall, the evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs
are less likely to be replaced, and that in firms with managerial ownership, political
connection can further weaken the turnover-performance relationship. These results
are generally consistent with our main hypotheses.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

Table 5 lists the results of our comparison of CEO turnover and firm and CEO
characteristics. Panel A shows the results for politically connected versus
non-politically connected firms based on whether the CEOs are politically connected.
As column 1 illustrates, firms with politically connected CEOs not only exhibit
significantly lower CEO turnover (t-value = -2.06) but also significantly lower firm
performance (t-value is -5.84). In Panel B, however, which compares SOEs with
privately controlled firms, the differences in CEO turnover are insignificant,
indicating no difference in turnover between SOEs and privately controlled firms.
Nonetheless, the average performance in SOEs is better than that in privately
3

Because of their similarity, we do not report the results here, but the data are available from the authors on
request.
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controlled firms. These results provide evidence that CEOs in SOEs retain their
positions for longer and are older than their counterparts in privately controlled firms
(t-values = 4.27 and 12.36, respectively). Panel C, which compares firms with forced
CEO turnover and normal turnover, suggests that both experience poor performance
while forced one have worse ROS. Overall, the evidence in Table 5 mostly supports
our hypotheses.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
5.2 Multivariate tests
Table 6 reports our regression estimations of the impact of CEO political
connection on the turnover-performance relationship for the total sample. The firm
performance measure in Panel A is the industry-adjusted ROA; in Panel B, it is the
industry-adjusted ROS. Overall, the results given in Table 6 clearly show that a firm’s
poor prior performance is significantly related to CEO turnover, a finding consistent
with the evidence presented in Table 3 and one that supports our Hypothesis 1 that
poorly performing CEOs are more likely than other CEOs to be replaced. Likewise,
although the results are not robust to all our specifications, CEO political connection
is negatively associated with CEO turnover, which supports Hypothesis 2 that CEOs
with political connections are generally less likely to be replaced. Here, the interaction
term between prior firm performance and political connection remains positive and
significant at the 1% level in all specifications, strongly supporting Hypothesis 3 that
political connection lowers the turnover-performance sensitivity. This finding offers
new evidence that political connection feeds into the entrenchment ability of poorly
performing CEOs.
In addition, Mown, the proportion of shares held by the CEO, is negatively
associated with CEO turnover, but the coefficient is not significant. The interactive
17

term between Mown and political connection, however, is negatively associated with
CEO turnover, which suggests that politically connected CEOs, particularly those
with more equity ownership, are less likely to be replaced. Similarly, the interaction
term between political connection and the private firm dummy has a negative
coefficient: political connected CEOs in privately controlled firms are less likely than
those in state-owned firms to be replaced. One possible explanation for this
observation is that politically connected CEOs bring benefits to privately controlled
firms and hence have lower turnover rates.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE

Some control variables capture the possible influence of firm or CEO
characteristics on CEO turnover. Of these, CEO age has a positive effect on turnover,
whereas CEO tenure has a negative effect on turnover. As regards corporate
governance variables, board size, independent director proportion, and CEO duality
have no effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, in contrast to prior studies, we find no
relation between CEO turnover and firm size and leverage.

5.3 Tests for robustness
The above analyses using firm performance as the criterion for replacing top
management support the hypothesized association between CEO turnover and poor
firm performance, which in turn implies that CEOs may focus on short term
performance and have the incentive to manipulate cash flows and earnings (Chang
and Wong, 2009). However, as our summary statistics show, the average CEO tenure
is 3.26 years, suggesting that this use of annual firm performance may not totally
reflect a CEO’s ability or contribution. Rather, bad firm performance could result
18

from such industry risks as policy and regulation changes and/or macroeconomic
factors. We therefore create two additional firm performance measures, AROA
(AROS), the average industry-adjusted ROA (ROS) over CEO tenure, and DROA
(DROS), a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm ROA (ROS) is higher than the
median ROA (ROS) and 0 otherwise. We then re-estimate our main regression using
these two additional measures in place of annual firm performance. We find broadly
similar results to those reported in Table 6. Some may argue that poor prior stock
performance is important for CEO forced turnovers, if small investors are able to
exert influence on such disciplining mechanisms. We hence run the regression of CEO
turnover by including stock annualized returns as independent variable which turn out
to be insignificant.
We also recognize that political connection is not completely exogenous; that is,
certain firms (e.g., poor performers) may be more likely to hire CEOs with political
connections. Therefore, to control for this endogeneity in our multivariate analysis,
we carry out a two-stage logit regression in which the first stage controls for the
selection of CEOs with political connections and the second stage uses the predicted
probability of political connection as the variable of interest. The general results,
given in Table 7, are similar to those for our OLS regression except that some
variables in the 2SLS regression are less significant. For example, the interaction term
between ROA and political connection remains significant and positive, suggesting
that political connection reduces the CEO turnover-firm performance relationship.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE

6. Post-turnover performance
The previous results suggest that CEO turnover is indeed related to poor firm
19

performance and that replacing the incumbent CEO is expected to improve firm
profitability and performance when firms encounter financial distress. Our results also
suggest that this relationship differs across firms with and without political connection.
We therefore take advantage of our sample to examine the association between
political connection and the changes in firm performance surrounding CEO turnover.
6.1 Political connection versus nonpolitical connection
To examine post-turnover performance in politically versus non-politically
connected firms (i.e., those with politically versus non-politically connected CEOs),
we run univariate tests on the firm performance changes surrounding CEO turnover in
each type of firm. Table 8 summarizes the mean and median of both the
industry-adjusted ROA and ROS from three years before to three years after CEO
turnover (year t = the year in which CEO turnover occurs, year t-1 = one year prior to
CEO turnover, and year t+1 = one year after CEO turnover).
As Panel A shows, in politically connected firms, the mean (median) ROA shows
a decline from three years before CEO replacement up to year t in which the CEO is
replaced. After CEO replacement, the mean (median) ROA increases steadily all
through the subsequent three years reaching 1.63 (2.41) in year t+3. The summary
results for ROS show a similar trend: the mean (median) ROS decreases over the
three years before the CEO turnover but begins to increase after the CEO turnover,
reaching 2.47 (3.83) in year t+3. For the non-politically connected firms, reported in
Panel B, the mean (median) of both the ROA and the ROS decrease from year t-3 to
year t and then increase to 2.35 (3.02) and 3.63 (4.55), respectively, in year t+3. These
results provide clear evidence that CEO turnover is indeed associated with poor firm
performance and can help improve post-turnover firm performance.
We are also concerned, however, about the difference in firm performance
20

between politically and non-politically connected firms. We therefore compare firm
performance between the t-3 group, the t group, and the t+3 group, as well as the
average firm performance before CEO turnover and average firm performance after
CEO turnover and firm performance in the t groups of the politically and
non-politically connected firms. As Panel C shows, politically connected firms show a
marginally significant 1.83% (0.71%) drop in the mean (median) ROA (t-value = 1.67
(1.77)). After CEO replacement, the mean (median) ROA increases to 1.63 (2.41),
which although higher than that for the t group is insignificant (t-value = -1.08
(-1.60)). This comparison of average firm performance thus provides consistent
evidence that CEO replacement occurs because of poor firm performance and that
average firm performance increases significantly after CEO replacement (t-value =
-1.95 (-1.15)). The ROS comparison for politically connected firms provides similar
results but the range is larger. The mean (median) ROS decreases by 7.34% (1.76%)
from t-3 to t (t-value = 1.99 (1.88)) and increases by 4.92% (1.42%) from t to t+3
(t-value = -1.14 (-1.65)).
For non-politically connected firms, the results, given in Panel D, show a
significant 1.83% (0.71%) reduction in the mean (median) ROA (t-value = 2.38 (1.78))
but a 2.25% (1.08%) increase in year t+3 (t-value is -1.96 (-3.09)). The average firm
performance before and after CEO turnover is significantly higher than that for the
year t group (t-values = 2.16 (2.32) and -1.96 (-1.64), respectively). The ROS
comparison shows a broadly similar trend
Overall, this evidence is consistent with both our conjecture and our regression
results and reflects both the effectiveness of management monitoring and a weakened
turnover-performance relationship in politically connected firms. More important, the
results also show that post-turnover performance in non-politically connected firms is
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better than that in politically connected firms, which suggests an entrenchment effect
of politically connected CEOs.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE

In addition to the above univariate tests, we also apply the following regression to
test the effect of political connection on post-replacement firm performance in the
sample of firms in which CEO turnover occurs:
ΔPerf it = α 0 + α1 Politicalit + α 2 Sizeit + α 3 Boardit + α 4 Pondit
+ α 5 Levit + α 6 Ageit + α 7Tenureit + ε it

(2)

where Δ Perf is the change in firm performance used in the univariate tests. We
choose this measurement because it allows assessment of whether firm performance
increases following CEO turnover. All other variables are as defined in Equation (1).
The estimation results are given in Table 9, which reports the outcomes when the
dependent variable is measured as the difference in firm performance between the
average of year (t+1, t+3) and year t. 4 In general, the multivariate results suggest that
for politically connected listed firms, the post-turnover performance shows a less
significant improvement than in non-politically connected firms.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE

6.2 Turnover versus nonturnover
To enable comparison of post-turnover performance within politically connected
firms with and without CEO turnover, we assume a CEO turnover when the length of
CEO tenure reaches four years (because the average tenure for CEOs is 3.26 years).
We then run univariate tests on the firm performance changes surrounding this
4

We also apply three other firm performance measures; namely, the difference in firm performance between year
t+3 and t and between t-3 and t, and the average of (t-3, t-1) and t. The results for all three variables are consistent
with those for the above univariate tests.
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assumed turnover. 5 Consistent with the univariate tests reported in Section 6.1, in
Table 10, we summarize the mean and median of both the industry-adjusted ROA and
the industry-adjusted ROS from three years before to three years after CEO turnover.
For politically connected firms without CEO turnover (Panel B), the mean (median)
ROA remains positive before turnover but drops to negative after it, and the mean
(median) ROS shows a similar trend. In terms of the equality of the firm performance
changes during the period surrounding the turnover, the comparison results for the
firms with CEO turnover indicate that firm performance increases significantly after
CEO replacement (Panel C), while those for the firms without CEO turnover indicate
that firm performance across these years does not differ significantly (Panel D).
We also compare the degree of change in firm performance between firms with
forced turnover and those without connections whose CEOs are politically connected.
As Panel E, Table 10 shows, the difference test indicates that the increase in firm
performance for the group of firms with CEO turnover is significantly higher than that
for the group of firms without CEO turnover. Together with the evidence from the
summary statistics on politically connected firms with CEO turnover, the results
indicate that the CEO monitoring mechanism is effective in politically connected
firms. More important, the overall evidence suggests an entrenchment effect for
politically connected CEOs; that is, politically connected CEOs retain their
managerial positions even if they underperform. Once these politically connected
CEOs are replaced, however, post-turnover firm performance can improve
significantly.
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE

5

We also tested the robustness of these results using an assumed turnover at three years of tenure..
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To provide supportive evidence, we apply the following regression to examine the
effect of political connection on post-turnover performance using the sample of
politically connected firms:
ΔPerfit = α 0 + α1Turnoverit + α 2 Sizeit + α 3 Board it + α 4 Pond it
+ α 5 Levit + α 6 Ageit + α 7Tenureit + ε it

(3)

where Turnover is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is replaced and 0
otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Equation (2). In general, the regression
results, reported in Table 11, indicate that the turnover of politically connected CEOs
can produce a more significant improvement in firm performance than occurs in firms
where no such turnover takes place.
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE

7. Conclusion
In China, currently the largest transitional economy, political intervention and
influence have important implications for both social and economic activity. The
political connection of CEOs, particularly, whether in state-owned or privately
controlled firms, may be seen as both a means of securing property rights protection
and as a major source of rent-seeking behavior. In China, however, the lack of legal
protection for investors means that minority shareholders frequently have limited
influence over management. Thus, internal monitoring mechanisms, particularly CEO
turnover, play an important role in disciplining management. Because such turnover
may be linked to political connection, we examine the effect of CEO political
connection on corporate governance, focusing particularly on its association with
CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship. In doing so, we provide the
first empirical evidence that CEO political connection not only has a substantial
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impact on CEO turnover and the turnover-performance relationship but also a
differential effect on SOEs versus privately controlled firms.
Using an extensive 2002−2007 sample of China’s listed firms, we find that CEO
turnover

is

associated

with

poor

prior

firm

performance

and

that

turnover-performance sensitivity is stronger in privately controlled than in
state-owned firms. We also provide evidence that political connection has a negative
effect on CEO turnover, suggesting it can reduce the likelihood of CEOs’ being
replaced, and lowers turnover-performance sensitivity, implying a substitution effect
on internal disciplinary mechanism that enhances the entrenchment of poor-quality
CEOs with political backgrounds. We further find that privately controlled firms are
more likely than SOEs to retain politically connected CEOs and that the CEO
turnover-firm performance relationship is much weaker if the CEOs hold managerial
ownership. Following the forced turnover of CEOs, however, firm performance
improves, especially in firms whose CEOs have no political connections. Overall, our
findings suggest that in an emerging economy, political connections have a significant
influence on corporate governance; most particularly, an adverse effect on internal
monitoring mechanisms that results in undesirable management entrenchment.
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Table 1.

Reasons for CEO turnover

This table reports the reasons for and frequencies of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms between
2002 and 2007.
Reasons for turnover
1. Normal turnover

981

a

Percentage of sample
68.99%

Retirement

22

1.55%

Contract expiration

298

20.96%

Change in controlling shareholder

12

0.84%

Resignation

300

21.10%

Health

37

2.60%

Personal reasons

36

2.53%

Corporate governance reform

25

1.76%

Legal dispute

1

0.07%

Completion of active duties

14

0.98%

Important government position taken up

10

0.70%

Promoted to chairman or vice-chairman

92

6.47%

CEO position taken up at parent company

51

3.59%

Remaining as chairman or vice-chairman

70

4.92%

Going abroad to study

2

2. Forced turnover

441

0.14%
b

31.01%

New position ranked lower than CEO position

94

6.61%

CEO position taken up at an unlisted, smaller firm

22

1.55%

Dismissed

42

2.95%

Details not provided

294

20.68%

1422

100%

Total number of observations
a

Number of observations

We delete 20 cases in which the stated reason is retirement but the age of the departing CEO is

lower than 60. We also add 31 cases in which the tenure of the departing CEO is less than 1 year.
Eventually, we obtain 981 normal turnovers.
b

We add 20 cases in which the stated reason is retirement but the age of the departing CEO is

lower than 60. We also delete 31 cases in which the tenure of the departing CEO is less than 1 year.
Eventually, we obtain 441 forced turnovers.
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Table 2. Summary statistics
Variables

Mean

Median

Lower 25%

Higher 25%

quartile

quartile

Panel A: Summary statistics for the full sample
Turnover

0.23

0

0

1

ROA (%)

2.25

2.64

0.84

5.12

ROS (%)

4.05

4.43

1.49

9.80

Firm size (million)

3,940

1,770

1,010

3,390

Lev (%)

49.71

50.25

36.92

62.10

CEO tenure

3.26

3

1.92

4.33

CEO age

46.47

46

41

51

CEO duality

0.12

0

0

0

Board

9.76

9

9

11

Independent directors

3.13

3

3

4

Panel B: Turnover rate across years
Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

269

242

231

255

216

209

27.42%

23.96%

21.08%

22.87%

20.96%

20.63%

198

160

155

176

142

152

73.61%

66.12%

67.10%

69.02%

65.74%

72.73%

Forced turnovers

71

82

76

79

74

57

Percentage b

26.39%

33.88%

32.90%

30.98%

34.26%

27.27%

Total turnovers
Percentage

a

Normal turnovers
Percentage

a

b

The percentage of total turnover is the ratio of the number of turnovers to the total firm year

observations for a specific year.
b

The percentage of normal and forced turnover is the ratio of normal and forced turnovers to the

number of total turnovers.
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Table 3.

Forced turnover rate according to firm performance quartile
Firm performance

CEO turnover

Penal A: Summary statistics based on ROA (%)
Bottom quartile

-7.97(-2.56)

0.0939

Second quartile

-0.91(-0.91)

0.0747

Third quartile

1.17(1.15)

0.0658

6.21(4.95)

0.0457

Top quartile
Difference (t-test)

a

5.35***(2.35**)

Penal B: Summary statistics based on ROS (%)
Bottom quartile

-35.86(-5.99)

0.0959

Second quartile

-1.49(-1.52)

0.0699

Third quartile

2.09(1.86)

0.0636

20.27(10.79)

0.0507

Top quartile
Difference (t-test)
a

a

4.89***(2.20**)

The above table displays the results of the difference tests between the bottom and top quartiles

and reports the t-values (p-values).
The value in the firm performance column is the mean (median) within the quartiles.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Univariate test of CEO turnover based on performance and ownership
Politically connected

Non-politically connected

t-test

Panel A: Firms sorted by firm performance (ROA)
Upper

4.80(0)

6.32(0)

-1.92*(-3.62**)

Lower

7.83(0)

8.97(0)

-1.36(-1.87*)

t-test

-3.44**(-2.09**)

-2.85**(-1.72*)

Panel B: Privately controlled firms sorted by firm performance (ROA)
Upper

0.95(0)

7.52(0)

-5.43**(-2.64**)

Lower

7.96(0)

10.12(0)

-2.06**(1.05)

t-test

-4.31**(-2.31**)

-2.45**(-2.51**)

Panel C: Firms sorted by CEO’s equity ownership
Upper

2.61(0)

2.79(0)

-2.23**(-0.05)

Lower

7.74(0)

9.69(0)

-2.32**(-5.33**)

t-test

-6.47**(-4.79**)

-8.46**(-9.67**)

The mean (median) value is CEO turnover rate (%), and “Upper” and “Lower” refer to firms
whose performance is above or below the median value.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

32

Table 5.

Comparison of firm and CEO characteristics
Turnover

ROA

ROS

Levera

Firm

ge

size

Board

Pond

CEO

CEO

tenure

age

Obs

Panel A: Firms sorted by CEO political connection
Political

6.32

-1.03

-3.91

50.21

21.36

2.27

0.32

3.15

46.93

(0)

(-0.16)

(-0.13)

(50.17)

(21.26)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.67)

(47.00)

7.64

0.24

-3.59

49.24

21.41

2.24

0.33

2.90

44.45

(0)

(0.13)

(0.12)

(50.37)

(21.32)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.58)

(43.00)

t-test

-2.06

-5.84

-0.12

1.49

-1.90

4.31

-4.49

5.69

14.95

Wilcoxon test

(0.91)

(3.69)

(1.86)

(0.61)

(1.82)

(4.05)

(5.39)

(3.24)

(14.62)

Non-political

3039
3258

Panel B: Firms sorted by firm type
SOEs

6.95

-0.04

-1.21

48.57

21.49

2.27

0.32

3.08

46.28

(0)

(0.04)

(-0.09)

(49.40)

(21.41)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.67)

(46.00)

7.14

-1.35

-10.98

52.95

21.07

2.19

0.34

2.87

43.86

(0)

(-0.10)

(0.27)

(52.36)

(21.01)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.5)

(43.00)

t-test

-0.26

4.26

1.67

-4.25

17.02

13.48

-10.80

4.27

12.36

Wilcoxon test

(0.12)

(2.09)

(1.02)

(4.93)

(14.68)

(12.48)

(8.08)

(3.11)

(12.80)

-2.41

-21.98

53.05

21.33

2.25

0.32

3.14

43.76

(-0.79)

(-1.05)

(52.11)

(21.25)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.2)

(43.01)

-2.45

-14.48

51.51

21.22

2.24

0.32

2.83

43.67

(-0.74)

(-1.01)

(51.55)

(21.16)

(2.19)

(0.33)

(2.00)

(43.00)

0.07

-0.66

0.60

1.81

1.19

-0.65

2.94

0.27

(0.78)

(1.03)

(0.33)

(1.52)

(0.21)

(0.15)

(3.05)

(0.45)

Private

Panel C: Firms sorted by turnover type
Forced

N/A

Normal
t-test
Wilcoxon test
a

N/A

1638

a

This comparative sample excludes the firm year observations without CEO turnover.

The table reports the mean (median) values.
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4659

441
981

Table 6. Logit regression results for the total sample
Dependent variable: Probability of forced CEO turnover
Panel A: Regression results when firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted ROA
Constant

-7.14***(-3.86)

-7.53***(-4.04)

-6.94***(-3.60)

-6.92***(-3.62)

ROAt-1

-1.41**(-2.38)

-5.00***(-4.40)

-4.89***(-4.29)

-4.86***(-4.27)

Political

-0.33***(-2.71)

-0.25**(-2.07)

-0.16(-1.19)

-0.09(-0.69)

4.55***(3.75)

4.29***(3.50)

4.37***(3.55)

-0.12(-1.43)

-0.12(-1.41)

-0.10(-1.39)

ROAt-1*Political
Mown

-0.14(-1.55)

Mown*Political

-5.26*(-1.65)

Private

-0.01(-0.01)

-0.06(-0.04)

Private*Political

-0.57*(-1.73)

-0.58*(-1.74)

Size

0.04(0.58)

0.06(0.90)

0.05(0.70)

0.04(0.61)

Age

0.84**(2.12)

0.82**(2.09)

0.77*(1.93)

0.79**(2.02)

Tenure

-1.43***(-26.62)

-1.42***(-26.70)

-1.43***(-27.09)

-1.42***(-26.71)

Board

0.19(0.69)

0.18(0.63)

0.12(0.45)

0.12(0.42)

Pond

1.04(1.33)

0.95(1.23)

0.98(1.27)

0.99(1.27)

Lev

-0.06(-0.04)

-0.09(-0.39)

-0.06(-0.22)

-0.04(-0.17)

Duality

-0.36*(-1.64)

-0.33(-1.55)

-0.28(-1.36)

-0.27(-1.27)

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Pseudo R

0.2695

0.2739

0.2759

0.2785

Obs

6297

6297

6297

6297

Industry
2

Panel B: Regression results when firm performance is measured by industry- adjusted ROS
Constant

-6.69***(-3.62)

-6.67***(-3.60)

-5.97***(-3.13)

-5.99***(-3.16)

ROSt-1

-0.08**(-2.40)

-0.19**(-2.20)

-0.19**(-2.19)

-0.18**(-2.19)

Political

-0.32**(-2.57)

-0.29**(-2.34)

-0.18(-1.42)

-0.12(-0.92)

0.23**(2.49)

0.22**(2.48)

0.22**(2.50)

-0.14(-1.58)

-0.14(-1.55)

-0.12(-1.55)

ROSt-1*Political
Mown

-0.15(-1.59)

Mown*Political

-5.31*(-1.67)

Private

-0.03(-0.16)

-0.03(-0.18)

Private*Political

-0.57*(-1.72)

-0.58*(-1.75)

Size

0.02(0.28)

0.02(0.19)

-0.02(-0.04)

-0.02(-0.10)

Age

0.82**(2.06)

0.82**(2.06)

0.75*(1.87)

0.78**(1.96)

Tenure

-1.43***(-26.55)

-1.43***(-26.48)

-1.43***(-26.90)

-1.43***(-26.53)

Board

0.19(0.67)

0.21(0.72)

0.15(0.51)

0.14(0.49)

Pond

0.96(1.22)

0.98(1.25)

1.02(1.29)

1.02(1.31)

Lev

0.16(1.53)

0.24**(2.00)

0.28**(2.13)

0.28**(2.12)
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Duality

-0.34(-1.59)

-0.36*(-1.65)

-0.31(-1.43)

-0.29(-1.35)

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Pseudo R

0.2686

0.2708

0.2729

0.2755

Obs

6297

6297

6297

6297

Industry
2

The dependent variable is the probability of forced CEO turnover. Firm performance is measured
by both return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of net income
before tax to firm total assets and of net income before tax to firm total sales, respectively. The
regressions employ both the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted ROS. Political is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; Mown is the
CEO’s control right, defined as the proportion of shares held by the CEO.; and Private is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm has a private controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. Size is the log
of firm total assets; Age is the log of CEO age; and Tenure is the log of years that the CEO has
held this position. Board is the log of total directors on the board and Pond is the proportion of
independent directors on the board. Lev is the firm leverage level, and Duality is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Two-stage logit regression.
First stage: Dependent variable = CEO political connection
Constant

-7.92***(-5.26)

ROA

-2.19***(-4.82)

ROS

-6.87***(-4.63)
-0.07(-0.29)

Tenure

0.03(0.88)

0.02(0.42)

Age

2.46***(7.57)

2.40***(7.42)

Size

-0.10**(-2.07)

-0.15***(-2.85)

Board

0.49**(2.28)

0.48**(2.23)

Pond

-1.22**(-2.46)

-1.26**(-2.55)

Duality

0.31**(2.08)

0.32**(2.20)

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Pseudo R

0.0332

0.0284

Obs

6297

6297

Industry
2

Second stage: Dependent variable = CEO turnover
Constant

-12.52(-0.76)

-11.82(-0.51)

ROAt-1

-11.70(-1.43)

-0.15(-1.00)

Political connection

-4.50(-0.38)

-5.83(-0.29)

Mown

-0.05**(-2.00)

-0.03**(-2.37)

ROAt-1*Political connection

12.46**(2.46)

0.42*(1.70)

Private

-0.86(-1.46)

-0.68(-1.10)

Private*Political connection

1.58(1.31)

1.15(0.91)

Mown*Political connection

-0.17**(-1.98)

-0.08**(-2.42)

Size

-0.07(-0.23)

-0.19(-0.28)

Age

3.23(0.46)

3.84(0.33)

Tenure

-1.38***(-12.81)

-1.41***(-15.58)

Board

0.62(0.44)

0.75(0.33)

Pond

-0.14(-0.04)

-0.59(-0.10)

Lev

0.13(0.76)

0.21*(1.91)

Duality

-0.05(-0.06)

-0.06(-0.04)

Year

Included

Included

Industry

Included

Included

Pseudo R

0.2731

0.2688

Obs

6297

6297

2

Here, firm performance is measured by both return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS),
and the regressions apply both the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted ROS. All
other variables are defined as in Table 7.
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The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8.

Firm performance surrounding CEO turnover
Year t-3

Year t-2

Year t-1

Year t

Year t+1

Panel A: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms

Year t+2

Year t+3

a

ROA

2.22(2.30)

2.73(2.31)

2.04(1.83)

0.39(1.59)

0.89(1.49)

1.48(1.76)

1.63(2.41)

ROS

4.99(4.17)

6.49(4.28)

1.46(3.07)

-2.35(2.41)

-0.45(2.49)

2.73(3.18)

2.47(3.83)

Observations

85

111

151

192

141

100

83

Panel B: Summary statistics for firm performance in non-politically connected firms b
ROA

2.66(2.67)

2.43(2.55)

1.30(1.94)

0.10(1.94)

1.96(2.66)

2.68(2.51)

2.35(3.02)

ROS

5.69(5.75)

1.89(4.67)

0.09(3.23)

-28.71(3.77)

-4.24(3.90)

2.77(4.47)

3.63(4.55)

Observations

96

134

183

249

196

153

112

Panel C: Difference tests for firm performance surrounding politically connected CEO turnover
Different

(t-3 and t)

tests
t-tests

(average of (t-3, t-1) and

(t and average of (t+1,

t)

t+3))

(t and t+3)

of

1.67*(1.77*)

2.86***(2.94***)

-1.95*(-1.15)

-1.08(-1.60)

of

1.99**(1.88*)

2.12**(1.89*)

-1.98**(-1.03)

-1.14(-1.65*)

ROA
t-tests
ROS
Panel D: Difference tests for firm performance surrounding non-politically connected CEO turnover
Different

(t-3 and t)

tests
t-tests

(average of (t-3, t-1) and

(t and average of (t+1,

t)

t+3))

(t and t+3)

of

2.38**(1.78*)

2.16**(2.32**)

-1.96**(-1.64*)

-1.96**(-3.09***)

of

2.15**(2.79***)

1.71*(1.88*)

-1.81*(-1.70*)

-2.16**(-2.12**)

ROA
t-tests
ROS
a

This group of firms replaced politically connected CEOs.

b

This group of firms replaced non-politically connected CEOs.

Note: the value used for the comparisons are the industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted
ROS. The table reports the mean (median) values.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9.

CEO political connection effect on post-turnover performance for firms with CEO

turnover
Dependent variable

∆ROA

∆ROS

Political

-0.02*(-1.76)

-0.02**(2.57)

Size

0.02**(2.53)

0.04**(2.20)

Board

-0.03(-1.15)

-0.13*(-1.64)

Pond

0.01(0.12)

0.03(0.15)

Lev

-0.08**(-2.31)

-0.36***(-3.59)

Age

0.05(1.16)

0.12(1.09)

Tenure

-0.01(-0.12)

0.01(0.83)

Industry

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

459

459

0.04

0.05

Observations
2

Adjusted R

Here, the dependent variable is the difference in firm performance between the averages for years
(t+1, t+3) and t. All other variables are defined as in previous tables. We report only the results for
the primary variables.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10. Comparison of firm performance surrounding CEO turnover in politically connected
firms
Year t-3

Year t-2

Year t-1

Year t

Year t+1

Year t+2

Year t+3

Panel A: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms: with CEO turnover
ROA

2.22(2.30)

2.73(2.31)

2.04(1.83)

0.39(1.59)

0.89(1.49)

1.48(1.76)

1.63(2.41)

ROS

4.99(4.17)

6.49(4.28)

1.46(3.07)

-2.35(2.41)

-0.45(2.49)

2.73(3.18)

2.47(3.83)

Observations

85

111

151

192

141

100

83

Panel B: Summary statistics for firm performance in politically connected firms: no CEO turnover a
ROA

0.33(0.16)

0.61(0.19)

0.53(0.05)

0.10(0.16)

0.53(0.03)

-0.84(1.07)

-1.43(0.55)

ROS

1.25(0.69)

2.45(0.15)

1.62(0.28)

0.13(0.28)

0.75(-0.09)

-0.40(1.28)

-0.55(-0.16)

Observations

180

205

236

306

220

156

57

Panel C: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding politically connected CEO turnover
Different

(t-3 and t)

tests
t-tests

(average of (t-3, t-1)

(t and average of

and t)

(t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

of

1.67*(1.77*)

2.86***(2.94***)

-1.95*(-1.15)

-1.08(-1.60)

of

1.99**(1.88*)

2.12**(1.89*)

-1.98**(-1.03)

-1.14(-1.65*)

ROA
t-tests
ROS
Panel D: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding politically connected CEO turnover
in firms without turnover a
Different

(t-3 and t)

tests
t-tests

(average of (t-3, t-1)

(t and average of

and t)

(t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

of

-0.42(-0.28)

-0.85(0.36)

0.81(-0.49)

-1.34(0.05)

of

-0.55(-0.98)

-0.76(-0.15)

0.32(-0.86)

-2.27**(-0.73)

ROA
t-tests
ROS
Panel E: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE across these two groups (turnover vs. no turnover)
Different

(t-3 and t)

tests
t-tests

(average of (t-3, t-1)

(t and average of

and t)

(t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

of

-1.14(-0.19)

-2.64***(-2.43**)

2.07**(1.70*)

1.21(2.19**)

of

-1.70*(-0.13)

-1.64*(-1.83*)

1.66*(1.68*)

1.72*(2.97***)

ROA
t-tests
ROS
a

The comparison results in Panels C, D, and E are based on an assumed CEO turnover at four

years of tenure (because CEO tenure averages 3.26 years).
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Table 11.

CEO turnover effect on subsequent firm performance for politically connected

firms
Dependent variable

∆ROA

∆ROS

Turnover

0.06**(2.46)

0.02**(2.04)

Size

0.03***(6.25)

0.03(0.29)

Board

-0.02(-0.14)

-0.04(-0.13)

Pond

0.04(0.93)

0.70(0.76)

Lev

-0.15***(-7.00)

-0.63(-1.45)

Age

0.02(0.73)

-0.03(-0.06)

Tenure

0.05(1.28)

-0.02(-0.31)

Year and Industry

Included

Included

Observations

1461

1461

0.05

0.03

2

Adjusted R

Here, the dependent variable is the difference in firm performance between the averages for years
(t+1, t+3) and t. All other variables are as defined in previous tables. We report only the results for
the primary variables.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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